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The events of 1999
Sörenberg is a typical small tourist resort
located on the periphery of the Swiss Alps
in Central Switzerland (Figure 1). The vil-
lage has developed only during the last 40
years; prior to that, it was known as a spa.
Today, about 800 housing units—mainly
secondary homes (chalets and tourist
apartments)—are situated on old debris
flow deposits. In addition, a number of
sports and leisure facilities have been con-
structed in recent years. The slopes above
the village belong to a large (15 million m3)
and deep-seated (100 m) landslide com-
plex (sagging or rock flow). Signs of
instability in this area have been appar-
ent since the mid 19th century or even
earlier.
On 14 May 1999 this landslide com-
plex showed increased activity, as was the
case in many other landslide areas of
Switzerland. Approximately 250,000 m3
of rock detached from the main mass.
This collapse is presumed to have been
triggered by the accumulation of
snowmelt from March to May, as well as
by 30 mm of rainfall on 14 May. Debris
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Debris flows represent a widespread threat
to villages and small towns in the Swiss
Alps. For many centuries people “managed”
such risks by trying to avoid hazardous
areas. However, major debris flow and flood
events in the last 25 years have revealed
that the degree of freedom to engage in this
type of risk management has substantially
decreased. This became especially evident
during the 1999 disasters in a number of
places in Switzerland. The winter of that year
was unusually wet. In February heavy snow-
fall triggered destructive avalanches. In May
high temperatures caused heavy snowmelt,
with excessive rainfall contributing more
water to the already saturated soils. Land-
slides, debris flows and floods were trig-
gered in many locations, including Sören-
berg. Hazard prevention and disaster man-
agement have a long tradition in Switzerland,
although an integrated approach to risk man-
agement is rather new. Only in recent years
have methods and tools been developed to
assess hazards, define protection goals, and
implement disaster reduction measures. The
case of Sörenberg serves as an example of
how today’s approaches to disaster reduc-
tion are implemented at the local level.
FIGURE 1  The tourist resort of
Sörenberg, located in the Entle-
buch Biosphere Reserve, Central
Switzerland. The village is locat-
ed at the foot of a deep-seated
landslide complex. The bright sur-
faces mark the geomorphological
zones active in 1999. (Photo by
author)
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flows, originating in the freshly deposited
soils, developed and traveled downhill
for days, weeks and months following 
14 May. All flows followed the course of a
small creek and arrived in an open space
between 2 village districts 150 m in width
(housing lots not yet occupied). Surpris-
ingly, no avulsion occurred on the debris
flow fan. Hence damage in the densely
populated village districts was rather lim-
ited.
Management of recent disasters
These events took the municipal authori-
ties completely by surprise. They immedi-
ately established a number of emergency
measures to protect inhabitants, prepare
for further debris flows, and generally
manage the crisis, including:
• Establishment of a crisis manage-
ment committee with a crisis man-
agement center for overall coor-
dination;
• Formulation of evacuation plans for
approximately 100 houses. Special con-
sideration had to be given to frequent
tourist turnover in the chalets;
• Visual monitoring of the zone where
the debris flow originated: volunteers
(mainly elderly persons living in the vil-
lage) were asked to observe conditions
in the headwaters;
• Installation of wire sensors in two loca-
tions to detect debris flows;
• Regular geodetic survey of the large
moving rock mass (every 2 to 3
months);
• Installation of a continuously recording
rain gauge in the headwaters;
• Implementation of small-scale structur-
al measures such as dams, channel
excavation, etc.
Due to ongoing debris flow activity—
nearly every minor rainfall event was fol-
lowed by a debris flow—the above-men-
tioned measures remained effective
throughout the year. After initial assess-
ment of the situation, it was decided to
perform an in-depth analysis of the condi-
tions, establish a hazard map, and propose
long-term solutions for the protection of
the village and its inhabitants.
Past events: a key to current risks?
Analysis of past events makes an important
contribution to the understanding of pres-
ent and future hazards in a particular
location. A number of historic documents
such as maps (Figure 2), postcards or pho-
tographs, as well as a detailed description
of the 1910 events by the famous geologist
Albert Heim, provided the necessary
information to reconstruct the sequence
of landslide events in the 20th century.
Between 1860 and 1910 the entire com-
plex shifted downhill by more than 30 m
in a large vertical movement. In 1910
another large vertical movement
occurred, lasting several days and causing
2 major lateral collapses and massive
debris flows of over 3 million m3.
Throughout the rest of the 20th century
development was irregular. Several lateral
and frontal collapses occurred in 1912,
1922, and 1986, with 6 decades of geomor-
phic inactivity in between.
At the beginning of the 20th century
the area now occupied by the village was
used as grazing land. The map (Figure 2)
indicates that the existing few houses in
Sörenberg were arranged around the
church in a safe place. Within the accu-
mulation area of the 1910, 1912 and 1922
debris flows, only a very few isolated hous-
es were destroyed.
Sörenberg’s development into the
tourist resort that it is today took place
only over the past 30 to 40 years. The 1918
map (Figure 2) clearly shows that at that
time only very few buildings were located
in what was once a highly active accumula-
tion area. Today this area is completely
covered by houses (Figure 3). The long
period of geomorphic inactivity following
the events of 1922 was interpreted as a
sign of future security. An analysis by
experts in 1974 proved that there was no
immediate threat, but did not altogether
exclude the possibility of damaging
events. An indication of the uncertainty of
the situation was provided by displace-
ment measurements begun in 1978. These
clearly show that the whole mass is contin-
uously moving about 3 to 10 cm per year.
The speed of this movement increased
dramatically in 1999 but has slowed down
again since.
FIGURE 2  1918 topographic map, showing
the open scars on either side of the mass
and the typical accumulation features devel-
oped in 1910 and 1912. The few houses with
the church (at the center of the village) are
located in a safe place. (Map reproduced by
permission of Bundesamt für Landestopogra-
phie, BA024084)
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Secondary processes caused by pri-
mary movement occur only after relatively
long intervals. It can be concluded that
Sörenberg remains at risk. The risk of fur-
ther collapses and subsequent flows must
be taken into account, even though condi-
tions above the village are currently calm.
However, it is assumed that large-scale
events such as the ones in 1910 are no
longer possible. These facts were consid-
ered in the hazard map that was prepared
in 2001 (Figure 4A).
Long-term solutions at the village
level
The first step towards definition of protec-
tive measures is a thorough investigation
of all hazards and the creation of a hazard
map. In Switzerland, such maps are based
on definite probability and magnitude
classes. Under present conditions, most of
the village is within red and blue hazard
zones (Figure 4A), ie those subject to a
high or moderate risk, respectively. This
constitutes a de facto ban on future eco-
nomic development of the village: con-
struction of new houses and major changes
to existing houses are normally not permit-
ted within the red zone. This, of course,
was not acceptable to the municipal
authorities. Solutions had to be found that
would guarantee the safety of the popula-
tion while at the same time allowing mod-
erate development of the village.
According to the municipal authori-
ties, structural protection measures need
to be implemented in order to “reduce
the colors” on the hazard map. Cantonal
authorities, on the other hand, call for an
integrated approach to risk and disaster
reduction. To them it is obvious that the
principal hazards cannot be completely
eliminated. In the case of Sörenberg the
following protection goals were defined
for events at different intervals:
• Once every 30 years: damage not
acceptable;
• Once a century: limited degree of dam-
age acceptable;
• Once every 300 years: limited protec-
tion for assets provided;
• Casualties are not acceptable for any
type of event.
A number of structural and non-struc-
tural measures were planned between
2001 and 2003 with these protection goals
in mind. They are currently being dis-
cussed among local, cantonal and federal
authorities. The local population has been
informed through public hearings and
publication of the various projects. Resi-
dents have the right to make objections.
The measures include:
Land use planning:
• A set of regulations in the local land
use plan and building code defines
what is possible in red, blue and yellow
zones. These regulations should curb
further increase of vulnerability (see
Table 1 and Figure 4B).
• In addition to village regulations,
plans call for a complete ban on graz-
ing throughout the landslide-prone
area as well as an increase in forest
cover.
• Municipal and cantonal authorities
established a hazard map for the whole
area in order to show whether adjacent
areas are more suitable for village
development. Unfortunately, there are
only a few places that are appropriate
as housing lots.
Structural measures:
• People argued that the primary process
should be stopped. Geophysical investi-
gations showed, however, that control
of the water table in this extremely frac-
tured and fast-moving mass is hardly
possible;
• A number of (reasonable) structural
protection measures (Figure 4B, green
markings) are planned to reduce the
risks to a bearable level. But even with
these protection measures, some parts
of the village remain in the red danger
zone. Owing to financial constraints,
the state would like to minimize these
measures. The local authorities, on the
other hand, have an interest in reduc-
ing the red zone as much as possible.
Costs of about CHF 14 million (US$ 10
million) will be shared by the canton
and the municipality, with heavy subsi-
dies from the federal government.
Home owners may also make contribu-
tions.
FIGURE 3  1993 topographic map, showing
how the village has developed in the past 30
years in the area where debris flow formerly
accumulated. (Map reproduced by permission
of Bundesamt für Landestopographie,
BA024084)
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Emergency planning: Public safety cannot
be fully guaranteed by structural meas-
ures. Emergency measures should provide
additional risk reduction:
• Long-term monitoring: regular dis-
placement measurements (every half
year) and continuous rainfall (thresh-
old values for rainfall exist) are used
for early warning;
• Short-term observation: visual observa-
tion in case of increased instability (as
successfully implemented in 1999);
wire sensors to detect ongoing debris
flow activity and instantaneous rainfall
intensity provide information to alarm
and evacuate people.
This set of measures should guarantee
the safety of the population and existing
assets. It also should guarantee further
development of the village in areas where
this is suitable.
Concerns and constraints
Design of structural measures was accom-
plished in autumn 2003 and the public
had a chance to react to the project. Land
use plans and the building code now need
to be approved in a referendum (2004).
Current expert opinion clearly differs
from public opinion, at least among part
of the population. The reasons are mani-
fold:
• There are still major uncertainties
about natural processes, even after
detailed investigations. A new event
(similar to that of 1999 or even bigger)
could occur within the next year. On
the other hand, the next 20 or 30 years
could also remain calm. It is important
to communicate these uncertainties to
local authorities and residents. More-
over, such uncertainties increase when
environmental change is considered.
• People have a hard time understanding
probabilities of 0.03, 0.01 or even less.
For most people, the next 10 to 20
years are a relevant time frame. An
event that occurs statistically once in
100 years is something very abstract.
• The movements of the entire mass have
slowed in the last 2 years. In the popu-
lar mind, this is a sign of improvement.
• Public safety is guaranteed by a set of
measures. Whereas land use regulations
and structural measures have a perma-
nent effect, preparedness measures
require awareness over years or even
decades. It is doubtful that such aware-
ness can be maintained for infrequent
events.
• Enforcement of land use regulations
(particularly in the red zone) will
become increasingly difficult if no
events, even small-scale debris flows,
occur in the coming years.
FIGURE 4, A AND B  Hazard
map for Sörenberg. Top (A)
before, and bottom (B) after the
implementation of the planned
structural measures. Red: high
degree of hazard; blue: moder-
ate degree of hazard; yellow:
low degree of hazard; yellow-
white: hazards with a very low
probability of occurrence;
green: planned structural meas-
ures. (Maps reproduced by per-
mission of swisstopo,
BA035840)
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Conclusions
Centuries ago people tried to manage natu-
ral risks by avoiding endangered zones.
Nowadays this strategy is no longer possible.
Most of the safe places are taken. Other
measures are required to reduce the pre-
vailing risks and enable further develop-
ment. The Swiss strategy takes an integrated
approach in which structural and non-struc-
tural measures are balanced and together
contribute to public safety and protection
of assets. Preferences vary, depending on
point of view (home owners and municipal,
cantonal or federal authorities).
Structural measures in Sörenberg
will protect existing assets to a certain
degree and enable further development.
However, parts of the village will have
relatively strict restrictions prohibiting
the construction of new buildings. Well-
functioning preparedness measures also
contribute to safety. This requires a cer-
tain level of awareness over years or
decades. If the mountain continues to
move and small debris flows occur occa-
sionally, it will be easier to maintain this
awareness and to enforce land use regu-
lations.
Degree of risk New buildings Existing buildings
High
Construction of new buildings prohibited Normal maintenance of buildings permit-
ted. Modifications only if number of per-
sons in a building is not increased
Moderate
No planning of new residential areas.
Construction on existing housing lots per-
mitted under local protection
Modification only with increased safety
measures (local protection): eg, elevated
entrance, no dormitories in basement, etc
Low Local protection recommended; requiredfor sensitive buildings
No restrictions
Very low Not considered Not considered
TABLE 1  Overview of hazard zones and building restrictions in Sörenberg.
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